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The United States and the Articles of
Confederation: Drifting Toward Anarchy or
Inching Toward Commonwealth?*
On June 7, 1776, Richard Henry Lee proposed to the Second Continental Congress "[t]hat these United Colonies are, and of right ought
to be, free and independent States," and "[t]hat a plan of confederation
be prepared and transmitted to the respective Colonies for their consideration and approbation."' Lee's resolution reflected the linkage
between independence and confederation in the public mind. 2 The
result was the Articles of Confederation, drafted in 1776-1777 and finally ratified on March 1, 1781, which remained in effect until 1789
and represented the first American experiment with a written national charter. 3
The conventional view of this period is that it was dominated by
deep factional conflict concerning the amount of power that should
be vested in the national government. 4 The text of the Articles, according to this view, represented a victory for the group favoring
minimal national authority, 5 and as a result the Articles government
* The author acknowledges with gratitude the assistancc of Professor William E.
Nelson of the Yale Law School in providing critical guidance and granting permission
to make use of unpublished research materials.
1. 5 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 425 (W. Ford ed. 1906) [hereinafter cited
without cross-reference as JOURNALS].
2. See NEw JERSEY IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1763-1783: A DOCUMENT.ARY HISTORY
402 (L. Gerlach ed. 1975) (issues of independence and confederation were inseparable)
[hereinafter cited as DOCUIENTARY HISTORY]; cf. Jensen, The Articles of Confederation, in
FUNDAMENTAL TESTAMENTS OF TilE AMERICAN RLvoI.UTIoN 62 (Library of Congress Symposium on the American Revolution 1973) (politicians who opposed confederation did
so because they saw it as step toward independence) [hereinafter cited as Jensen,
TESTA

ENTS].

3. Other plans of confederation had been proposed during the colonial period. See,
e.g., 6 THE WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 420-25 (A. Sinyth ed. 1906); 2 HISTORY OF
THE CELEBRATION

OF TIlE ONE HUNDREDTH

ANNIVERSARY

OF Till: PROMLI.GATION

OF TiltE

CONSTITUTION OF TIlE UNIrED STATES 439 app. (H. Carson ed. 1889); J. SCoTT, THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA: A STUDY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 471 app. (1920).
4. See, e.g., H. HENDERSON, PARTY POLITICS IN TilE CONrINENTAL CONGRrss (1974); J.

Davis, Sections, Factions, and Political Centralism in the Confederation Period: 1774-1787,
at 381-89 (1972) (unpublished doctoral dissertation for Unihersity of Wisconsin). See
generally M. JENSEN, TIE NLw NATION (1950) [hereinafter cited as M. JrNSEN, NATIONj.
Professor Jensen is the leading authority on the drafting and text of the Articles by
virtue of his book M. JLNSEN, Tile ARTICLES OF CoNI-rDrRATION (1940) [hereinafter cited
as M. JENSEN, ARTICLLS]. This work has been reprinted with new prefaces (1948, 1959,
1970) reflecting the changes in the author's thinking over the ears; the text, however,
remains unaltered.
5. See M. JETNSEN, ARTICLES, supra note 4, at 11-12.
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was barely functional. 6 Its inability to handle crises such as Shays'
Rebellion stimulated a centralist reaction that led to the drafting
of the Constitution in 1787T and the establishment of a stronger national government.8
This Note disputes the accepted view of the Articles Period and
interprets the years 1777-1789 as ones in which the national government gained and exercised increasing powers. The legal and political
institutions created during this period were the basis for the Constitution's national federalism, a political structure characterized by
state deference to national power in certain major policy areas and
the common recognition of a national citizenship given reality by
comity among the states.9 Examination of the drafting history and
actual text of the Articles suggests that the document was the result
of a drive toward union, not an obsession with decentralization. In
fact, the national government grew in power and institutional strength
from 1777 to 1789, and the theoretical and institutional structures of
the government of the early Constitution Period owed a very substantial debt to those of the Articles Period.
I.

Formal Federalism: The Drafting and Text of the Articles

The leading historian of the Articles of Confederation asserts that
their adoption represented a victory for "radicals," who wanted a
weak central government, over "conservatives," who favored greater
6.

See p. 149 & note 48 infra (citing sources).

7. See M. STARKEY, A LITTLE REBELLION 242 (1955) (but for Shays' Rebellion, Federal Constitution might not have come to pass); R. TAYLOR, WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS
IN THE REVOLUTION 103-77 (1954); id. at 168 ("[C]ertainly the upheaval in Massachusetts
and the fear that disorder would spread intensified the demand for a stronger central
government.")
8. The classic expression of this idea remains J. FisKE, THE CRITICAL PERIOD OF
ANJERICAN HISTORY 1783-1789 (illustrated ed. 1897). See, e.g., id. at 177-78 ("The events
of 1786 impressed upon men's minds more forcibly than ever the wretched and disorderly
condition of the country, and went far toward calling into existence the needful popular
sentiment in favour of an overruling central government.")
9. The national federalism that began to emerge during the Articles Period thus
meant that the states had surrendered certain aspects of their sovereignty, and that the
national government would deal directly with individuals. See note 151 infra. This
Note does not suggest that the Constitution's structure of government was created by
the Articles or that today's structure of government appeared in 1789. Rather, it seeks
to point out the significant ways in which the government of the early Constitutional
Period rested on that of the Articles Period, just as the government of today rests on
that of the early Constitutional Period. Neither the Articles nor the Constitution, by
themselves, created strong centralized structurcs. Both, for instance, contained broad clauses
reserving all powers not delegated to the national government to the states. See U.S.
CoxsT. aniend. X; ARTICIES cF CO\FEDERATION art. II, reprinted in 9 JOURNALS at 908
[hereinafter cited as ARTICLES with page citation to 9 JOURNALS].
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national power for the protection of property rights. 10 This conventional view is undermined by a critical examination of the drafting
process and the textual provisions of the Articles. The members of
Congress displayed a consistent willingness to compromise or surrender elements of state sovereignty in recognition of the overriding need
for full national authority in certain areas and for interstate cooperation and comity. The resulting Articles clearly express these principles of national authority and national citizenship.
A.

Drafting the Articles

While the dominance of the "radicals" is conventionally said to
be shown by their emasculation of "conservative" John Dickinson's
first draft and production of a final draft that left few powers to
the central government," the successive drafts of the Articles 12 do
not show such a steady movement from a strong to a weak central
government. For instance, between the first and second drafts, alterations in limiting language served to strengthen the supremacy
clause, 13 enhance central authority over the general budget, 14 and
10. This thesis is developed at length in M. JENSEN, ARTICLES, supra note 4. For a
clear definition of Jensen's use of the terms "radical" and "conservative," see Jensen,
The Idea of a National Government During the American Revolution, 58 POLITICAL
Sci. Q. 356, 360 n.7 (1943). There is a substantial and growing body of literature that
casts doubt on the validity of Jensen's dichotomy. See, e.g., Weir, "The Harmony We
Were Famous For": An Interpretation of Pre-Revolutionary South Carolina Politics, 26
WM. & MARY Q. 473 (3d ser. 1969) (study inconsistent with Jensen model); Rakove, Book
Review, 6 J. INTERDISCIPLINARY HIsT. 744, 746 (1976)

(reviewing H.

HENDERSON,

supra

note 4, and discussing flaws with his approach). See generally Greene, Changing Interpretations of Early American Politics, in THE REINTERPRETATION OF EARLY AMERICAN
HISTORY 151 (R. Billington ed. 1966).
11. See M. JENSEN, ARTICLES, supra note 4, at 130 (theory of Dickinson draft was to

make Congress supreme authority; final draft was pact among sovereign states that delegated certain powers and retained all others).
12. The first draft of the Articles [hereinafter cited as ARTICLES (draft 1)] was reported to the Continental Congress on July 12, 1776, by the committee that had been
appointed under Lee's resolution, see p. 142 supra, to prepare a plan of confederation. 5
JOURNALS at 546. The manuscript of this first draft is in the handwriting of John
Dickinson of Pennsylvania, is believed to have been largely drafted by him, and is
commonly known as the "Dickinson draft" of the Articles.
The first draft was revised by the Committee of the Whole, and a second draft [hereinafter cited as ARTICLES (draft 2)] was ordered printed on August 20, 1776. 5 JOURNALS at
689. Further congressional debates led to the printing of a third draft [hereinafter cited
as ARTICLES (draft 3)]. The final version of the Articles was essentially the same as the
third draft, with "sundry small amendments made in the diction, without altering the
sense." 9 JOURNALS at 907.
13. Compare ARTICLES (draft 1) art. XII, 5 JOURNALS at 678 ("Every Colony shall abide

by the Determinations of the United States assembled, concerning the Services performed
and Losses or Expences incurred by every Colony for the common Defence or general
Welfare.
...) with ARTICLES (draft 2) art. X, 5 JOURNALS at 678 ("Every State shall
abide by the determinations of the United States in Congress Assembled, on all questions which by this Confederation are submitted to them.")
14. The first draft read: "The United States assembled shall have Authority for the
Defence and Welfare of the United Colonies and every of them, to agree upon and fix

Articles of Confederation
increase national military powers.15 Between the second and third
drafts of the Articles, further centralizing changes were made, including the addition of an article granting "the free inhabitants
of each of these states . . . all the privileges and immunities of free

citizens in the several states,"' 6 requiring that "[f]ull faith and credit
shall be given in each of these states to the records ...

of every other

state,"' 7 and mandating interstate extradition. s At the same time,
the framers further strengthened the budget authority,19 and added
a provision granting congressional immunity. 20 Although there were
also important changes that weakened national authority, 2' most notably the strengthening of the article recognizing the reserved powers
23
of the states,2 2 there was no overall movement in that direction.
The drafting process reveals that Congress shared the country's desire
for confederation. 24 The members knew that union could only be
tile necessary Sums and Expences . . . ." ARTICLES (draft 1) art. XVIII, 5 JOURNALS at
683 (emphasis supplied). The second draft deleted the italicized language, and with it
the burdensome requirement that each expenditure be demonstrably for the benefit of
each state. See ARTICLES (draft 2) art. XIV, 5 JOURNALS at 683.
15. Compare ARTICLES (draft 1) art. XVIII, 5 JOURNALS at 683 (authority to raise naval

forces from states and issue regulations for them) with ARTICLES (draft 2) art. XIV, 5
JOURNALS at 682, 684 (authority to build and equip navy and direct its operations).
16. ARTICLES (draft 3) art. IN', 9 JOURNALS at 908-09. The first draft contained a weaker
form of this provision, ARTICLES (draft 1) arts. VI, VII, 5 JOURNALS at 676, dropped from

draft 2, that required comity among the states in matters of migration and ;Trade, Navigation, and Commerce," but in all other cases restricted citizens of other states to
the rights they already enjoyed.
17. ARTICLES (draft 3) art. IN, 9 JOURNALS at 909. The judicial implementation of this
clause is discussed at pp. 159-60 infra.
18. ARTICLES (draft 3) art. IV, 9 JOURNALS at 909; see p. 162 & note 138 infra.
19. Congress, which had previously been authorized only *'to agree upon and fix
the necessary sums and expences," ARTICLES (draft 2) art. XIV, 5 JOURNALS at 683, was given
the new power -to appropriate and apply" the revenue, ARTICLES (draft 3) art. XIV, 9
JOURNALS at 920.

20. ARTICLES (draft 3) art. V, 9 JOURNALS at 910; see p. 161 & note 135 infra.
21. For example, in the first draft the states "unite[d] themselves so as never to be
divided by any Act whatever," and entered into a league of friendship, ARTICLES (draft 1)
art. II, 5 JOURNALS at 674. In the succeeding draft the nature of the union was recharacterized to retain only the league of friendship, see ARTICLES (draft 2) art. II, 5 JOURNALS
at 674.
22. See M. JENSEN, ARTICLES, supra note 4, at 175 (change concerned "basic constitutional issue of the Revolution"); cf. Letter from Thomas Burke to the Governor of North
Carolina (April 29, 1777), r-clrinted in 2 LETTERS OF MEMBFRS OF TIE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 345-46 (E. Burnett ed. 1923) (author of change notes that it caused little controversy
among members) [hereinafter cited as LETTERS]. Compare ARTICLES (draft 2) art. III, 5
JOURNALS at 675 wilh ARTICLES (draft 3) art. II, 9 JOURN'.LS at 908.
23. See1p. 166 infra (Appendix summariLing changes made during drafting of Articles).
24. See, e.g., Jefferson, Notes of Debates in the Continlental Congress, in 6 JOURNALL

at 1102 (Mr. Chase observed that "our importance, our interests, our peace required
that we should colfedera te"); J. WNrI ItsS'oox, Speech in Congress (July 30, 1776), in 9
THE WORKS OF JOHN WITHERSPOON, D.D. 135 (Edinburgh 1805) ("The absolute necessity
of union ... i.; felt and confessed by every one of us, without exception."); Letter from
Corn[elius] Harnett to Governor Caswcll (Mar. 20, 1778), reprinted in 13 THE STATE
RLcoRns Or NoRxT CAROLINA 386 (W. Clark ed. 1896) (every member of Congress but one
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attained if the final version of the Articles proved acceptable to all
thirteen state legislatures. The most important objectives of the draftsmen, therefore, were to overcome centrifugal forces 25 and achieve the
greatest possible degree of support for each position taken.
For example, on the volatile issue of the basis of representation in
the national legislature, Thomas Jefferson accurately predicted that
"the good whigs" would "cede their opinions for the sake of the
Union.12 0 Although the small states, which favored a one-state, onevote plan, 27 held a clear majority and could have enacted their wishes
at any time, 28 they engaged in lengthy discussions and numerous attempts at compromise2 9 with the larger states, which favored voting
..seems to wish for a Confederacy") [hereinafter cited as REcoRDs]; Letter from Edward
Rutledge to Robert R. Livingston (Oct. 2, 1776), reprinted in LETTERS, supra note 22,
at 113.
For views of religious leaders, see, e.g., E. HUNTINGTON. THE HAPPY EFFECTS OF UNION
AND THE FATAL TENDENCY OF DIVISIONs 11, 12, 13, 17, 20 (Hartford 1776); R. Ross, A
SERMON

IN WHICH THE UNION

OF THE COLONIES IS CONSIDERED AND

RECOMMENDED;

AND

THE BAD CONSEQUENCES OF DIVISION ARE REPRESENTED 5, 6-7 (New York 1776). For views

of private persons, see, e.g., T. PAINE, COMMON SENSE 30, 56, 61, 71-72 (Philadelphia
1776) (favoring union as soon as possible because it would be more difficult to achieve
later); Letter from William Hooper to Robert Morris (Feb. 1, 1777), reprinted in COLLECTIONS OF THE NEW-YORK HISTORICAL SOCIETY FOR TIlE YEAR 1878, at 418 (1879) [hereinafter cited as COLLECTIONS 1878].
In addition to their shared desire for union, the members' agreement on such other
matters as the importance of state sovereignty and the need for "virtue" in public
officers, both seen as important checks on the corrupting influence of political power
on officeholders, smoothed the road to compromise at many points. See, e.g., A. MATHER,
THE CHARACTER OF A WELL ACCOMPLISHED RULER DSCRIB'D (New Haven 1776). See
generally THE ANTIFEDERALISTS xxv-xxx, xcviii-xcix (C. Kenyon ed. 1966) (discussing shared
beliefs of political opponents).
25. Concerning the divisions caused by parochialism, see, e.g., H. HENDERSON, suPra
note 4, at 53-54, 60, 113-20 (discussing numerous controversies over the appointments of
specific generals to the Continental Army); Letter from William Duer to Robert R.
Livingston (May 28, 1777), reprinted in LETTERS, supra note 22, at 231. Yet these disputes
also led to congressional assumption of a conciliating role, exemplified by the resolution:
"That a letter be written to General Schuyler, requesting him to recommend, in the
strongest terms, harmony between the officers and troops of the different states; [and]
to discountenance and suppress all provincial reflections and ungenerous jealousies of
every kind .... " 5 JOURNALS at 591.
26. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (May 16, 1777), reprinted in 2
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 19 (J. Boyd ed. 1950).
27. On the positions in the representation debate, see generally Adams, Notes of
Debates in the Continental Congress, in 6 JOURNALS at 1081; Jefferson, supra note 24,
at 1104-06; Letter from William Williams to the Governor of Connecticut (July 5,
1777), reprinted in LETrERS, snpra note 22, at 399-400.
28. The delegates to the first Continental Congress, after a debate similar to that
in the second, had decided to give each state one vote at least on a temporary basis.
The stated ground for this decision was a lack of adequate population data. The
result was to do what a majority of the delegates wanted without giving offense to
the others. See M. JENSEN, ARTICLFS, supra note 4, at 57-59.
29. For instance, feeling "that the smaller states should be seculed in all questions
concerning life or liberty, and the greater ones in all respecting property," Samuel
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according to population. Eventually, a spirit of compromise prevailed:
the delegates achieved virtual unanimity30 as the larger states, seeing
the need to accommodate the smaller ones,3 1 supported the one-state,
one-vote plan.
The process of compromise that marked the drafting debates is
clearly visible in the surviving rollcall votes on various other provisions 32 and in the congressional appeal to the states for ratification
of the Articles. 33 This process was successful in gaining the support
of the states. Although nine states formally requested modifications
in the Articles, 34 eleven ratified them within a year of their promulgation, and all thirteen states ultimately did so. 35 A typical response
came from the Delaware Council, which felt that the terms of the
Articles were "in divers respects unequal and disadvantageous to this
state," but ordered its delegates to ratify them because of "the present
necessity of acceding to the Confederacy proposed."3 6
B.

The Text of the Articles

What is most remarkable about the drafting and ratification of
the Articles is that the political community reached broad agreement
on a wide variety of provisions that formed the bedrock of a new
Chase of Maryland "proposed that in votes relating to money, the voice of each colony
should be proportioned to the number of its inhabitants" while each state should have
only one vote in all other matters. Jefferson, supra note 24, at 1102. Roger Sherman
of Connecticut and Thomas Jefferson both proposed plans under which either the
acquiescence or the approval of a majority of both the states and the national population would be required in certain instances. See Adams, supra note 27, at 1081;
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams, supra note 26, at 19.
30. In the four recorded rollcall votes on representation, the majority position
carried by a total of 40 to 5, see 9 JOURNALs at 779-82. The motion to grant each state
one vote carried 10 to 1, id.
31. See E. BURNETr, THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 249 (1941).
32. The records of the sixteen rolicall votes taken on the Articles are to be found
in 9 JOURNALS at 779-82, 801, 803-04, 807-08, 835, 843, 849, 850, 879, 896, 934, 935. Their
most salient characteristic is their consistent one-sidedness; aggregating the results of
all these votes, the majority positions carried by a margin of 125-30. Rollcalls normally
indicate questions about which there is some disagreement. Large portions of the Articles
were approved without dissent by voice votes. See, e.g., id. at 826, 833-34, 848.
33. See 9 JOURNALS at 932-34 (Articles as proposed are compromise, reflecting "disposition to conciliate" in order to secure plan affording "tolerable prospect of a general
ratification," and should be examined by legislators in liberal spirit in view of "absolute
necessity of uniting").
34. See Harmon, The Proposed Amendments to the Articles of Confederation (pts. 1-2),
24 S. ATLANTIC Q. 298, 411 (1925).
35. See 1 Tim DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE R,%TfIcATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 96-

137 (M. Jensen ed. 1976) (giving dates and texts of state requests for modifications and
state ratifications) [hereinafter cited as RATIFICATION].

36.

Delaware Council Resolution of January 28, 1779, reprinted in id. at 131.

147
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national federalism. 37 The Articles contained significant grants of
power and authority to the national government.
The first stone in the federal structure under the Articles was a
supremacy clause: "Every State shall abide by the determinations of
the United States, in Congress assembled, on all questions which,
by this confederation, are submitted to them. And the articles of this
confederation shall be inviolably observed by every State ....,,38 This
clause was reinforced by a series of prohibitions designed to prevent
the states from interfering with the plenary authority granted Congress over military, diplomatic, and commercial affairs.3 9
Furthermore, the Articles granted significant financial powers to
the national government. Congress assumed the debts previously incurred for national purposes, 40 and received authority to defray all
expenses "that shall be incurred for the common defence or general
welfare."141 To implement this power, the national government was
given the exclusive rights to regulate the value of both national and
state coinage, "to appropriate and apply the [necessary sums of money]
for defraying the public expences," and "to borrow money or emit
bills on the credit of the united states." 42 The Articles also created
the basis for a national judicial system. 43 They empowered the gov37. See G. WooD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 359 (1969)
("What is truly remarkable about the Confederation is the degree of union that was
achieved.") Although recent writers occasionally have taken this view, see, e.g., Young,
The Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union, 63 A.B.A.J. 1572 (1977), the Articles
are conventionally regarded as having created "a confederation so loose that it had
no power," Wright, The Relation of Law in America to Socio-Economic Change, 28
ARK. L. REv. 440, 450 (1975); see, e.g., I J. HARE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 16-18
(1889); 1 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMtocRAcY IN AmERICA 116-18 (P. Bradley ed. 1945). In setting forth the concept of a national federalism based on deference to national power in
certain areas and recognition of a common citizenship, this Note suggests not only that
the Confederation government did have power, but also that the existence and exercise of
that power had important implications for the future of the country's development.
38. ARTICLES art. XIII, 9 JOURNALS at 925; cf. U.S. CONSr. art. VI, cl.2 (supremacy
clause). The supremacy clause of the Articles was fully as effective in requiring state
judges to follow national policy in those matters committed to national control as
is the supremacy clause of the Constitution. See pp. 153-54 & note 77 infra.
39. See pp. 150-54 infra. The prohibitions on state action are to be found in ARTICLES
art. VI, 9 JOURNALS at 911-13.
40. ARTICLES art. XII, 9 JOURNALS at 924; see J. FISKE, supra note 8, at 101 ("[B]y
assuming all debts contracted by Congress prior to the adoption of the articles, and
solemnly pledging the public faith for their payment, it was implicitly declared that
the sovereignty here accorded to Congress was substantially the same as that which it
had asserted and exercised ever since the severing of the connection with England.")
41.
42.

ARTICLES
ARTICLES

art. VII, 9 JOURNALS at 913; see p. 161 & note 132 infra.
art. IX, 9 JOURNALS at 919-20; see p. 154 infra.

43. For a general discussion of this system, see Sergeant, A Brief Sketch of the National Judiciary Powers Exercised in the United States, From the First Settlement of
the Colonies to the Time of the Adoption of the Present Federal Constitution, in P.
Du PONCEAU, A DISSERTATION ON THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF TIlE JURISDICTION OF TIlE
COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES 135-58 (Philadelphia 1824).

Articles of Confederation

ernment to set up "courts for the trial of piracies and felonies committed on the high seas," and also to establish courts with appellate
44
jurisdiction over all prize cases.
In addition to reposing important governmental powers at the national level, the Articles sought to create a system of interstate cooperation and comity. The two most important provisions in this
regard were the privileges-and-immunities and the full-faith-and-credit
clauses, 45 provisions that created a "universal intercitizenship" that
"gave reality to the nascent and feeble Union." 46 Congress, moreover,
was made "the last resort on appeal in all disputes . . . between two
or more states, concerning boundary, jurisdiction or any other cause
47
whatever."
II. Institutional Federalism: Substantive Powers and the
Development of Government Machinery, 1777-1789
The conventional view is that American political history from the
Declaration of Independence to the Constitution was dominated by
"the complete inability of the government set up by the Articles
of Confederation to function."" This view ignores effective exercises
of national power that took place during this period and the evolution of institutions extending beyond the text of the Articles. Congress and the state judiciaries often read the Articles broadly and
expansively in response to the practical needs of the country. The
institutions created by Congress exercised wide powers that furthered
national unity, and the states acquiesced.
A. National Powers and Their Expansion
Even before actual fighting with the British began, the Continental
Congresses assumed broad military and administrative powers49 with44. ARTICLES art. IX, 9 JOURNALS at 916. For a discussion of how Congress used these
powers, see pp. 158-59 & notes 114-16 infra.
45. See p. 145 supra & pp. 159-60 infra; THE FEDERALIST No. 42 (. Madison) (privilegesand-immunities clause); Nadelmann, Full Faith and Credit to Judgments and Public Acts,
56 MIcH. L. REV. 33, 33-53 (1957) (full-faith-and-credit clause).
46. J. FiSKE, supra note 8, at 97.
47. ARTICLES art, IX, 9 JOURNALS at 916; see pp. 155-56 infra.

48. C. THACH, JR., THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY, 1775-1789: A STUDY IN CoxSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 16 (1922); see Miller, An Inquiry into the Relevance of the Intentions of the Founding Fathers, With Special Emphasis Upon the Doctrine of Separation
of Powers, 27 ARK. L. REV. 583, 589 (1973); O'Brien, The Executive and the Separation
Principle at the Constitutional Convention, 55 MND.Hisr. MAGAZINE 201, 205 (1960).
49. See G. WooD, supra note 37, at 355.
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out express legal authority, 50 and afterwards these developments continued.5 1 Congress construed its authority broadly within the area
of its delegated powers, especially in the war, foreign affairs, and fiscal fields, and continued to assume powers that had not been delegated. According to Madison, a catalogue of congressional actions that
were "violations of their chartered authorities" under the Articles
"would not a little surprize those who have paid no attention to
the subject."5 2 Informed contemporaries 5a and the states themselves
recognized this developmental process, and most supported it because
they agreed upon the desirability of a national confederation and
54
the practical necessity for its expansive assertions of power.
1. The War Power
The Revolutionary War was the most important basis for the assertion of broad congressional authority. In prosecuting the war, the
national government established practices and institutions that continued long after the fighting had stopped. Congress took those actions it deemed necessary, notwithstanding its lack of formal power,
and insisted that its judgment on military matters should be final.For example, the congressional decision in 1781 to authorize the
50. See Jensen, TESTAMENTS, supra note 2, at 61-62; cf. Penhallow v. 1)oane's Adm'vs.
3 U.S. (3 Dali.) 54, 80-82 (1795) (league existed among states prior to Articles and Congress exercised extensive revolutionary powers on its behalf).
51. See 2 I. BRANT, JAMES MADSO\ 129 (1918) (listing wartime actions showing expansive congressional interpretation of general welfare).
52. THE FEDERAI.IST No. 42 (J.Madison) 280 (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
53. See Letter from Thomas Burke to Governor Caswell (Mar. 11, 1777), reprinted ill
11 RECORDS, supra note 24, at 417-18, 421 Ihcreinafter cited as Burke-Caswell Letter];
Letter from Thonmas Paine to Robert Morris (Nov. 20, 1782). reprinted ill COLLAtIrO.,S
1878, supra note 2-, at 486.
54. See, e.g., Rosenberg, William Palerson: New Jersey's Nalion-Maher, 85 N.J. Hisr.
7, 23-24 (1967) (Paterson and other believers in states' rights still saw need for stlong
confederation); Commentary by "A True Patriot," New JeTsey Gazette, April 11, 1781,
rePrinted in DOCUMLNTARY HIsTORY, supra note 2, at 419 (central gosernuent needs
greater authority); Letter from Abraham Baldwin to Charles Thomson (Feb. It. 1786),
reprinted in COLLECTIOxS 1878, supra note 24, at 202-04 (Middle Atlantic and Southern
states are fasorably inclined toward increasing strength of union).
The state of Massachusetts prosecuted in its own name sedition ald treason against
the United States, granted agents of tie central goler'llellt inunllit% from suit oil
official contracts, and shaped its rules of law to effectuate the national power to issue
currency. See Nelson, The American Resolution and the l.nergence of Modern )octrines of Federalism and Conflict of Laws 18 nn.67 & 68, 20 n.75 (1969) (unpublished
essay on file with Yale Law Journal) (citing cases); cf. Respublica %.Sweers, 1 U.S. (I
Dall.) 41 (Pa. 1779), discussed in note 119 infra (state plosecutioll insols ing forging of
receipts with intent to defraud United States).
55. See Burke-Caswell Letter, sujpra note 53, at 421 (-1 am often suggesting to Congress that tile Civil Power of the States is the best instrument for calling forth their
proportion of exertions . . . but they hear with reluctance any thing that looks like
the interposition of such a power in military affairs .... ")
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seizure of supplies by the Continental Army has been called "one
of the decisive steps of the war,"' yet the impressment measure
Congress passed was not authorized by any specific provision of the
Articles and its terms directly contravened a number of state laws.57
Similarly, the evolution in form and function of the congressional
"Board of War and Ordnance" from 1776 to 178758 found its justification in practical rather than legal considerations.
As a general rule, the states cooperated in congressional extension
of the war power. Many state courts recognized congressional powers
in such military matters as prizes and governance of the army.59 For
instance, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the power of Congress to "direct the removal of any articles that were necessary to the
maintenance of the Continental army, or useful to the enemy," because Congress was "vested with the powers of peace and war."' 0
The state legislatures acquiesced in the broad jurisdiction of the
military justice system. Although the basis in the Articles for such a
power was questionable, 0 ' federal military courts exercised jurisdiction
not only over military and nonmilitary offenses of soldiers, but also
over spying and other illicit conduct by civilians within war zones.0 2
The nationwide use of such authority supplies one example of the
way the Continental Army, despite the political disputes it sometimes
04
engendered, 3 served as an important unifying force.
56. 2 I. BRANT, supra note 51, at 117.
57. See id. at 114-17. In 1776, acting on its own authority, Congress had given General
Washington the power to impress supplies. It then asked the states to pass laws authorizing impressments. Not liking the resulting state legislation, which seemed too
restrictive, Congress passed the 1781 resolution to override it.
58. See p. 157 infra.
59. See Nelson, supra note 54, at 19 & nn.73-74.
60. Respublica v. Sparhawk, I U.S. (1 Dall.) 357, 362 (Pa. 1788).
61. Dickinson in preparing his draft of the Articles apparently questioned the propriety of granting to the national government "[t]he power of arresting and trying
persons in the Service of the United States, in any Colony, without applying to the
Government of such Colony." 5 JoURNALs at 550 n.2. The only authority to be found
for the actions actually taken is ARTiCLES art. IX, 9 JOURNALS at 919 (Congress enpowered to make "rules for the government and regulation of the . . . land and
naval forces").
62. Brief for the United States at 35-42, O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969)
(listing 70 instances prior to 1783 where courts martial assumed jurisdiction of apparently nonmilitary criminal offenses committed by militdry personnel); Nelson, supra
note 54, at 20 & nn.77-80 (citing cases).
63. See, e.g., note 25 supra; 23 JOURNALs at 624-25, 629-31 (friction over nonpayment of
New Jersey troops),
64. See H. HENDERSON, supra note 4, at 325 ("The army was a nationalizing force,
both because it won the war and because of its unhappy status of being a public creditor."); H. WARD, THE DEPARTMENT OF WAR 1781-1795, at 41 (1962) (two favorite toasts
in the army were "A hoop to the l:rrel" and "'Cement to the Union").
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2.

Foreign Affairs Powers
The pre-Constitution Congress exercised considerable power in foreign affairs, and established enduring principles and institutions of
national diplomacy. 65 For example, representatives of Congress asserted in international negotiations that the United States collectively,
and not individually, had succeeded to all the sovereign rights of the
British Crown. Although not directly adopted by Congress, 60 the idea
survived as "a premise of infinite possibilities."'07 It not only framed
the national discussion of westward expansion, 8 but also seems to
have served as a source of substantive authority in foreign affairs
matters.
Certainly Congress asserted broad authority to make international
agreements and enforce them directly against individual Americans.
In proclaiming the 1783 treaty of amity and commerce with Sweden, 9
for example, Congress "enjoined and required" all the citizens and
inhabitants of the United States "to govern themselves strictly in all
things according to the stipulations" of the treaty.70 In 1781 Congress, apparently basing its action on a combination of its war powers
65. But see, e.g., Olson, The Sonderstrom Incident: A Reflection Upon Federal-Stale
Relations Under the Articles of Confederation, 55 N.Y. HIST. Soc'Y Q. 109 (1971) (conventional view that national foreign relations power during Articles Period could be and
was frustrated by states).
66. See 18 JOURNALS at 936 (letter of instructions to John Jay, Minister to France and
Spain); Letter from Robert Livingston to Benjamin Franklin (Jan. 7, 1782). reprinted in
5 THE REVOLUTIONARY DIP'LOMATIC CORRESl'ONDENCE OF TIlE UNITED STXIES 89 (F. Wharton
ed. 1889) [hereinafter cited as CORRESPONDENCE]. The inclusion of this claim in a proposed letter to the American peace negotiators triggered a controversy in Congress in
1783, but the legislators did not push the discussion to any resolution. See COLLECTIONS
1878, supra note 24, at 139-45 (notes of this debate by Secretary of Congress Charles
Thomson).
67. Corwin, The Progress of Constitutional Theory Between the Declaration of Independence and the Meeting of the Philadelphia Convention, 30 A.t. HIsT. REV. 511,
528 (1925). The Supreme Court has recently approved this view of the history. In 1975,
the Court confirmed the report of a special Master who had declared "that sovereignty
and dominion passed after independence to the national government in which the
powers of external sovereignty were reposed and not to the . . . States." Report of
Albert B. Mars, Special Master at 63, United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515 (1975); see
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316 (1936) ("the powers of
external sovereignty passed from the Crown not to the colonies severally, but to the
colonies in their collective and corporate capacity as the United States of America").
68. See COLLECTIONS 1878, supra note 24, at 145-50 (report by Secretary Thomson
of extensive debate on national sovereignty provoked by petition from residents of
"Kentuckey" seeking statehood); Welling, The States'-Rights Conflict Over the Public
Lands, 3 PAPERS AM. HisT. A. 411, 416-22 (1889), reprinted in J. WELLING, ADDRESSES,
LECTURES AND OTHER PAPERS 208-15 (1904).

69. 8 Stat. 60, T.S. No. 346 (1783).
70. 25 JOURNALS at 614. Eleven international agreements entered into by the United
States during the Articles Period, including treaties of friendship with the Netherlands,
Prussia, and Morocco, are to be found at 8 Stat. 6-115.

Articles of Confederation
and its power to enter into commercial treaties, 7 1 had enacted an
ordinance imposing an embargo on all trade with British subjects
and warning that the national government would punish individual
72
violators.
In implementing this expansive conception of the national foreign
affairs power, Congress was aided by an embryonic federal bureaucracy 73 and, more importantly from a practical standpoint, by deference from the states and their courts.7 4 Courts in Massachusetts, for
example, applied the peace treaty with Great Britain 75 in full, where
its terms were clear, to override conflicting state policies.70 The celebrated New York case of Rutgers v. Waddington,77 decided in 1784,
probably represented the prevailing view:
The foederal compact hath vested Congress with full and exclusive powers to make peace and war. This treaty [with Great
Britain] they have made and ... we are clearly of [the] opinion
71. On the role of the war power in the embargo, see 2 I. BRAN'r, supra note 51,
at 109, 111. For the power to enter into commercial treaties, see ARTiCLES art. IX, 9
JOURNALS at 915.

72. See 19 JOURNALS at 315-16 (Americans are "strictly enjoined and required" to
observe embargo and "will answer the same at their peril").
73.

See pp. 157-58 infra.

74. Several years later, Secretary of State Jefferson noted the acceptance .by the states
of the superiority of "treaties made by Congress according to the confederation" over
"the laws of the States." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Hammond (May
29, 1792), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, FOREIGN RELATIONS 209 (Washington
1833) (quoting state statutes and official documents in support of contention). The
strongest congressional assertion of the superiority of treaties to state legislation came
in a 1787 circular letter to the states reprinted in 32 JOURNALs at 177-84.
75. 8 Stat. 80. T.S. No. 104 (1783), reprinted in DOCUMENTARY SOURCE BOOK OF AMERICAN
His-TORy 1606-1926, at 204 (IV. MacDonald ed. 1926). Some of the provisions regularly
involved in lawsuits were Article IV, providing that creditors on either side should meet
with no legal impediments to the recovery of debts previously contracted; Article V,
stipulating, inter alia, that all persons having any interests in confiscated lands should
meet with no legal impediment in the prosecution of their rights; and Article VI,
barring future prosecutions or confiscations against any person by reason of the part
he may have taken in the war, and requiring the release of all those in custody on
such charges.
76. See Nelson, supra note 54, at 25-29.
77. See 1 THE LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON: DOCUMENTS AND COMM ENTARY 289-419 (J. Goebel, Jr. ed. 1964) (including transcript of opinion and documentation on case). The case was a statutory trespass action brought to recover damages
for defendant's occupation of plaintiff's property during the time New York City was in
British hands. Alexander Hamilton represented the defendant. The Mayor's Court of
the City of New York held that part of the action was' barred by the provisions of
Article VI of the peace treaty with Great Britain, see note 75 supra, the authorizing
state statute notwithstanding. See J. FISKE, supra note 8, at 135 (case important for
implicit assertion of rights of United States against legislature of single state); Letter from
Alexander Hamilton to Thomas Jefferson (Apr. 19, 1792), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN STATE
PAPERS, supra note 74, at 232 (Hamilton's view of case); cf. Respublica v. Gordon, I
U.S. (I Dall.) 233 (Pa. 1788) (refusing to sustain suggestion of attainder filed against
defendant, because doing so "would contravene an express article in the treaty").
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that no state in this union can alter or abridge, in a single point,
the foederal articles [of confederation] or the treaty.7 s
3.

Financial Powers

Financial problems plagued the new nation, and, lacking a dependable source of revenue, the Confederation never solved its money
troubles. 79 Nonetheless, on two occasions, twelve of the thirteen states
agreed to tariff proposals that would have provided such revenue.8 0
These plans probably would have made the Confederation government fiscally viable, because the mechanisms set up under the Articles
for handling the funds that did come in were virtually identical to
those existing in the early years under the Constitution.8 ' One such
mechanism, although it was of greater symbolic than practical significance,8 2 was the Bank of North America, which Congress incorporated in 1781 in an effort to ease the wartime shortage of capital.8 3

Although this action was assailed as wholly unauthorized by the Articles, its supporters considered it justified by the federal government's
"general powers . . . resulting from the union of the whole."8 4
4. Interstate Powers
The Confederation government also exercised a variety of powers
relating to problems that the states could not solve individually.8 5
78.

1 THE L,w PRACTICE OF ALExANDER HAMILTON, supra note 77, at 413. The court

did reserve power to determine "the operation and effects of the treaty" by "a fair
and reasonable construction" of it.
79. See generally McLaughlin, The Articles of Confederation, in ESSAYS ON THE
MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 57-60 (L. Levy ed. 1969).

80. See H. HENDERSON, supra note 4, at 325-38. Interestingly, Virginia initially approved the first revenue-raising plan, which was proposed as an amendment to the
Articles, and then effectively killed it by voting to reverse that approval. See id. at
327-28. This would seem to be a precedent for the validity of a state legislature's
rescission of its ratification of a constitutional amendment.
81. See generally p. 158 infra.
82. Cf. F. McDONALD, E PLURIBUS UNUM: TIH FORMATION OF THE AMERIcAN REPUBLIC
1776-1790, at 36 (1965) (Bank could help state governments put their finances on an
orderly basis, lower prices for imported goods, help manufacturers and farmers, and
serve as stabilizing mechanism by controlling money supply).
83. One strong additional motivation for the formation of the Bank is reflected in
Robert Morris's desire "to unite the several States more closely together in one general
money connexion, and indissolubly to attach many powerful individuals to the cause
of our country by the strong principle of self-love and the immediate sense of private
interest." Letter from Robert Morris to John Jay (July 13, 1781), reprinted in 4 CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 66, at 563.
84. J. WILSON, Considerations on the Bank of North America, in 2 THE WORKS OF
JAMES WILSON 829 (R. McCloskey ed. 1967).
85. Congress delegated an appreciable portion of this job to its President, an officer who sometimes had considerable political influence. See generally J. SANDERS, Tm
PRESIDENCY OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-89: A STUDY IN AMERICAN INSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY (2d printing, revised 1930); Klingelhofer, The Presidents of the United States

in Congress Assembled (pts. 1-4), 28 MANUSCRIPTS 2, 83, 171, 255 (1976).
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One important set of such powers grew out of the formation of a
national domain 6 as states with extensive claims to western lands
ceded them to the national government in the interests of interstate
harmony. Control over the national domain-an area larger than any
existing state-gave Congress an important source of wealth, 7 political patronage, power, and prestige. Although cession of the western
lands was only achieved after considerable political bickering,88 this
authority served as a powerful unifying force. 9
Congressional possession of the territory also led to the assertion
of broad powers to govern it. Despite the lack of any grant of such
a power in the Articles," Congress passed three major ordinances
concerning the territories between 1784 and 1787. 91 In these enact92
ments, Congress strongly asserted its sole authority over these areas,
and set up a detailed plan of territorial governance.9 3 Congress's assertion of its implied powers was thus not confined to fields in which
it held delegated authority. In order to extend to the western lands
"the fundamental principles of civil and religious liberty" on which
the original states had been erected, Congress assumed the power
"to fix and establish those principles as the basis of all laws, consti94
tutions, and governments" in those regions.
The Congress was also active in settling disagreements among the
states. The Articles set out in considerable detail the procedures for
86. For an explanation of the various cessions of state lands by which Congress came
into the control of these areas, see Jensen, The Creation of the National Domnain, 17811784, 26 MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV. 323 (1939-40).
87. See THE FEDERALIST No. 38 U. Madison); J. Davis, supra note 4, at 118, 155, 455
n.139; Letter from John Adams to Mr. Calkoen (Oct. 26, 1780), reprinted in 7 THE WORKS
OF JOHN ADAms 298 (C. Adams ed. Boston 1854).
88. See M. JENSEN, ARTICLES, supra note 4, at 198-224.
89. See H. HENDERSON, supra note 4, at 259 ("the West constituted a lure holding
the Confederation together, for only a united confederation could successfully exploit
its resources"); Hutchinson, Unite to Divide; Divide to Unite: The Shaping of American
Federalism, 46 Miss. VALLEY HIST. REV. 3, 9 (1959) (West became chief link between
states because it instilled confidence in payment of national debt, presented foreign
issues requiring national response, and caused expansion of congressional authority).
90. See THE FEDERALIST No. 38 (J. Madison); J. FISKE, supra note 8, at 221-23; Hutchinson, supra note 89, at 10-I.
91. Ordinance for the Government of Western Territory (Apr. 23, 1784), reprinted
in RATiICATION, supra note 35, at 150-53; Ordinance for the Sale of Western Lands
(May 20, 1785), reprinted in id. at 156-63; Ordinance for .the Government of the Territory of the United States North-West of the River Ohio (July 13, 1787), reprinted in id.
at 168-74 [hereinafter cited as Northwest Ordinance). See generally H. HENDERSON, supra
note 4, at 371-76.
92. See Ordinance for the Government of Western Territory, supra note 91, at 151-52.
93. See Northwest Ordinance, supra note 91, at 169-71 (providing inter alia for appointment of numerous officials and establishment of territorial legislature, and enunciating certain fundamental principles to be observed in territory).
94. Northwest Ordinance, supra note 91, at 172.
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Congress to follow in deciding any dispute between states,95 but these
formal arrangements were fully employed only once.0 6 Congress usually
would intervene in interstate disputes to resolve them without litigation. 7 The paucity of formal proceedings thus hid a substantial amount
of national activity in this area.
More visible was the post office, which developed in response to
the government's communication needs and became an important centralizing institution. The leaders of the Revolution recognized early
the importance of being able to communicate effectively with their
sympathizers in other colonies, 98 and the Continental Congress appointed its first postmaster nine months before the Declaration of
Independence.9 9 Under authority granted by the Articles, 10 0 Congress
spurned the cheaper method of sending the mail by horse and rider
and set up postal routes that would subsidize certain stagecoach services, in order to facilitate freer passage among the states. 10 1 By the
time of the drafting of the Constitution, national authority over the
growing10 2 postal service was vigorously defended as increasing national cohesiveness. 10 3
B.

The Machinery of Federalism: Administrative and Judicial
Implementation of National Power

During the 1770s and 1780s, a federal administrative structure began to emerge, a national court system started to function, and state
courts began to take measures giving reality to the ideas of comity
expressed in the Articles. The Articles Period thus saw the develop95. See ARTICLES art. IX, 9 JOURNALS at 916-18.
96. See Taylor, Trial at Trenton, 26 WM. & MARY Q. 521 (3d ser. 1969). The dispute
was between Pennsylvania and Connecticut and concerned title to the Wyoming Valley.
After a proceeding with all the earmarks of a common law trial, the commissioners
chosen to hear the case rendered judgment in favor of Pennsylvania, "and the government of Connecticut submitted as gracefully as possible." J. FIsKE, supra note 8, at 152.
97. Seven such instances are discussed in Davis, Federal Courts Prior to the Adoption of the Constitution, 131 U.S. 1-1xiii app. (1889). See I J. GOEBEL, HISTORY OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:

ANTECEDENTS AND

BEGINNINGS TO

1801, at 182-95

(1971); J. Welling, Land Politics of the United States, in ADDRESSES, LECTURES AND OTHER
PAPERS, supra note 68, at 159.
98. See Vermilye, The Early New York Post Office, 13 MAGAZINE AM. HiST. 113, 118-19
(1885).
99. See 2 JOURNALS at 208-09.
100. ARTICLES art. IX, 9 JOURNALS at 919.
101. See Holmes, Shall Stagecoaches Carry the Mail?-A Debate of the Confederation
Period, 20 Wm. & MARY Q. 555, 566, 573 (3d ser. 1963).
102. See M. JENSEN, NATION, supra note 4, at 363-64.
103. See THE FEDERALIST No. 42 (J. Madison) 287 (J. Cooke ed. 1961); Rush, Address
to the People of the United States (1787), reprinted in PRINCIPLES AND ACTS OF THE
REVOLUTION IN AMERICA 403 (H. Niles ed. Baltimore 1822).
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ment of a network of important liniks binding the country together
and providing a permanent basis for national governance.
1. The Embryonic Federal Administration
To enforce its substantive powers, Congress in the 1780s created
the beginnings of a federal bureaucracy. Although this administrative
framework was never more than rudimentary during the Articles
Period, it was a significant element of the government of national
federalism. The growth of a bureaucracy represented an expansive
interpretation of national powers and a functional implementation
of those powers on a small, but growing, scale.
With respect to the congressional powers over war, foreign affairs,
and finance, a clear pattern emerged. In each case, Congress first
established a standing committee of its own members to deal with
the area, but ultimately delegated most of the burden to an outside
administrative department created for the purpose. For example, Congress in June 1776 began to organize its exercise of war powers by
creating a standing committee, the "Board of War and Ordnance."
When the Board proved incapable of staying abreast of military affairs, 10 4 a "Board of War" consisting of three persons not members
of Congress was established in October 1777 and vested with important administrative duties and substantive powers. 10 5 In- 1781, the
legislators assigned many of this Board's duties to a single "Secretary
at War."'1 06 During the remainder of the Articles Period, the incumbents of the post gradually expanded their authority and, in addition
to auditing military accounts"OT and superintending military justice,
took control over such matters as administering the lands granted as
bounties to veterans and directing Indian affairs in the territories
governed directly by Congress.'"8
Similarly, the legislative committee formed in 1775 for the "purpose of corresponding with our friends in . . . other parts of the
104. H. WARD, supra note 64, at 2-3 (1962).
105. See 9 JOURNALS at 818-20. Among the many powers and duties of the Board
were to "superintend the raising, recruiting, and despatching, of the land forces" of
the United States, to "lay before Congress proper and seasonable estimates" of the
military supplies that would be needed, "and, in general, to superintend the several
branches of the military department." Id. at 819. The authorizing resolution contemplated that the Board members themselves would request legislation from Congress in
order to obtain such greater powers as they might consider necessary. See id.
106. See 19 JOURNALs at 126-27. This assignment took place three weeks before the
Articles went into effect, and was based on the belief that too much of the work of
the Board's various incarnations was still reviewable by Congress, thus clogging the
administrative machinery. See H. WARD, supra note 64, at 5-6.
107. See H. WARD, suPra note 64, at 83-88.
108. See M. JENSEN, NATION, supra note 4, at 365.
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world" 10 9 was replaced in 1781 by a regular "Department of Foreign
Affairs" to conduct the country's diplomatic business. By 1782 the
duties of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs were quite extensive and
included communicating to the states complaints lodged against them
by other states or citizens of other states. 110
The administration of financial affairs displayed the same pattern.
At first, Congress itself, through a committee, processed governmental
disbursements; but even while this system lasted, it became necessary
to hire a full-time staff to deal with the flow of business. Through
detailed legislation enacted in 1779, Congress delegated many of its
financial functions to a Treasury Board primarily composed of administrators who were not members of Congress."' This significant
step made the Treasury a more independent agency and opened the
way for the creation of a class of professional officeholders on the
policymaking level."12 The department underwent a number of structural changes during the 1780s, each of which had the effect of increasing its functions, and by 1789 it had established a set of systematic accounting procedures"'1 that was to endure well into the
next century.
2.

The Judicial System

The Articles authorized Congress to establish a national appellate
tribunal to decide maritime cases,
had exercised since 1775.1 14 Some
national level over an eleven-year
that resulted in outright reversals

a power the legislators themselves
maritime cases were heard on the
period, including about forty-nine
of the state court. 1a Execution of

109. 3 JOURNALS at 392. See also 5 JOURNALS at 425 (formation of foreign alliances
included in Lee's motion on independence).
110. See Guggenheimer, The Development of the Executive Departments, 1775-17S9,
in ESSAYS IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE FORMATIV
PERIOD 162 (J. Jameson ed. 1889).
111. See 14 JOURNALS at 903-08.
112. See H. HENDERSON, supra note 4, at 268.
113. See M. JENSEN, NATION, supra note 4, at 371-74.
114. Congress resolved in November 1775 that it would begin hearing such cases,
see 3 JOURNALS at 374, and the resolution was carried into effect the next year, see
H. BOURGUIGNON, THE FIRST FEDERAL COURT 48-50 (1977). In March 1776, Congress also
began to authorize and control privateering. See 4 JOURNALS at 230-32, 253-54. Under
ARTICLES art. IX, 9 JOURNALS at 916, Congress was given the power of erecting "court,
for the trial of piracies and felonies committed on the high seas." Congress exercised
this prerogative on April 5, 1781, see 19 JOURNALS at 354-56, by designating certain state
judges to sit on such cases.
115. See H. BOURGUIGNON, su]pra note 114, at 208, 217. Congressional transformation
of the tribunal from a standing commiltee to a formal and independent court took
place almost a year before ratification of the Articles authorized it. See Penhallow v.
Doane's Adm'rs, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 54 (1795) (holding that action had neverthel.-s ileen
proper). See generally Daiis, supra note 97, at xix-xlix (includes list of 104 decided
admiralty cases). Certain of the court's opinions are printed at 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 1-42.
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the national judgment was, however, generally a routine matter. 116
State courts in the Articles Period generally gave effect to the
Articles' provisions for interstate comity. 117 These provisions, argued
before courts"ls and construed and applied as authoritative by judges
of the period, led to cases reaffirming national sovereignty" 9 and
foreshadowing many aspects of later constitutional development. 2 0
Much litigation focused on the full-faith-and-credit clause, as judgment creditors from one state frequently sought to bring suit on their
judgments in the courts of other states. 121 State judges regularly gave
"full credence . . . to judgments of the courts in any of the United
States"' 2 2 so long as both parties had been within the jurisdiction
of the court rendering judgment and had received or could have
116. See H. BOURGUIGNON, supra note 114, at 236. There was substantial agreement
that the area was a proper one for the application of a uniform national law. Indeed,
most states explicitly instructed their admiralty judges "to use the resolves of Congress
and the law of nations in preference to state laws as the legal norms for deciding cases
of capture." Id. at 75. Congress expressly resolved, on December 4, 1781, that the "rules
of decision in the several courts shall be the resolutions and ordinances of the United
States in Congress assembled, public treaties when declared to be so by an act of
Congress, and the law of nations, according to the general usages of Europe," 21
JOURNALS at 1158 (basing action on ARTIcLs art. IX, 9 JOURNALS at 915).
117. See p. 149 supra.
118. For example, in urging the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to enforce a Massachusetts attachment under the full-faith-and-credit clause of the Articles, counsel in
one case argued that the Articles had created a union stronger than any known to
history and that in adopting the clause "the authors of the system intended to make a
Judgment in New-Jersey as binding in Pennsylvania, as if it had been obtained in any
County of this State." Phelps v. Holker, I U.S. (1 DalI.) 261, 263 (Pa. 1788).
119. See, e.g., Respublica v. Sweers, I U.S. (1 DalI.) 41 (Pa. 1779). The defendant
argued that he could not have defrauded the United States because, in 1777 and 1778,
they were not a corporate entity "known in law." Id. at 44. His conviction was upheld,
with the court writing: "From the moment of their association, the United States
necessarily became a body corporate .... " Id.
120. For example, there are strong Eleventh Amendment undertones in the case
of Nathan v. Virginia, 1 U.S. (I Dall.) 77 note (Philadelphia C.P. 1781), in which the
plaintiff was held unable to attach in Pennsylvania certain property belonging to the
State of Virginia, in satisfaction of a debt.
Similarly, a dispute involving due process, judicial review, and privileges and immunities arose in Bayard v. Singleton, I N.C. (Tay.) 5 (Super. Ct. 1787). In this ejectment
action, the defendant claimed the benefit of a law providing that anyone who lived on a
confiscated estate needed only to file proper proof of that fact in order to win automatically in any challenge to his title. The plaintiffs, represented by James Iredell and
others, insisted that the law unconstitutionally deprived them of the right to trial by
jury. The court upheld this position, saying, "these plaintiffs being citizens of one of
the United States, or citizens of this State, by the confederation of all the States; which
is to be taken as a part of the law of the land, unrepealable by any act of the General
Assembly," could not be deprived by statute of the right to a jury trial. Id. at 7.
121. Plaintiffs seemed undeterred by the fact that during the drafting of the Articles
the Congress had defeated by a vote of 5-2 a proposal to add to the clause an explicit
statement that "an action of debt may lie in a court of law of any State for the recovery of a debt due on a judgment of any court in any other State." 9 JOURNALS at
895; cf. note 148 infra (incorporation power presented similar situation under Constitution).
122. Kibbe v. Kibbe, I Kirby 119, 126 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1786).
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received a fair trial. 23 Thus the full-faith-and-credit clause of the
Articles allowed a debtor sued in Pennsylvania to defend successfully
124
on the basis of his discharge under the insolvency laws of Maryland.
Similarly, Massachusetts courts entertained suits on out-of-state judgments anid, when appropriate, gave effect to out-of-state statutes.'" 5
III.

Constitutional Federalism: Governmental Continuity,
1777-1789, and Its Implications

The continuing growth of the authority of the national government in the Articles Period provides a useful context for examining
the drafting and adoption of the Constitution. During the decade before 1787, the major principles of state deference to national power
in certain areas and recognition of national citizenship were established, and major organs of the national government were created.
Thus the theory and the practice of the period laid the foundation
2
for the Constitution. 6
A.

Textual Continuities

Numerous provisions of the Constitution were both conceptual and
textual descendants of provisions of the Articles or enactments during
the Articles Period. For example, over half of the clauses in Article
I, Section 8 of the Constitution, detailing the enumerated powers of
2
Congress, can be traced back to specific provisions of the Articles.
123. See id. (plaintiff's attempt to recover on a Massachusetts judgment fails because
Massachusetts court was without personal jurisdiction over defendant); cf. Phelps v.
Holker, I U.S. (I Dali.) 261 (Pa. 1788) (where plaintiff's Massachusetts judgment was
valid there only to extent of property actually seized, it would be given no greater
effect in Pennsylvania).
124. Millar v. Hall, I U.S. (1 Dall.) 229 (Pa. 1788); accord, Thompson v. Young, I
U.S. (1 Dall.) 294 (Philadelphia C.P. 1788). It seems clear that these cases overruled
James v. Allen, I U.S. (I Dall.) 188 (Philadelphia C.P. 1786), which reached an opposite
result.
125. See Nelson, supra note 54, at 21.
126. See R. BROWN, REINTERPRETATION OF THE FORMATION OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1-2 (1963) (-The Constitution did not spring full-blown from the pens of the

Founding Fathers as something completely new in goernment . ...
[W]e must consider
it as the product of a long evolutionary development.")
127. These powers include those relating to: borrowing (ompare U.S. CoNsT. art. I,
§ 8, cl.2 with ARTICLES art. IX, 9 JOURNALS at 920); Indian affairs (compare U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl.
3 with ARTICLES art. IX, 9 JOURNALS at 919); commercial regulation (compare
U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, c. 5 (power "[tio coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, ...
and fix the Standard of Weights and Measures") with ARTICL-S art. IX, 9 JouRNALS at 919
("power of regulating the alloy and value of coin struck by their own authority, or by
that of the respective states; fixing the standard of weights and measures")); the post
office (compare U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, ci. 7 with ARTICLES art. IX, 9 JOURNALS at 919);
creation of inferior courts (compare U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl.9 with ARTICLES art. IX,
9 JoURNALS at 916); international law offenses (compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.10
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Similarly, the congressional power "[t]o make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces"' 28 was added to
the Constitution "from the existing Articles of Confederation,"' 1-9 and
the authority "to borrow money or emit bills on the credit of the
United States"' 3 0 was embodied in the right "[t]o borrow Money on
the credit of the United States."' 13
Madison cited the Articles provision giving Congress the power to
defray from the common treasury all "expences, that shall be incurred
for the common defence or general welfare"' 32 when he argued in
support of the general welfare clause of the Constitution empowering
Congress "to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and
33
general Welfare of the United States.'
Both the Articles and the Constitution barred the states from interfering with the exercise of the enumerated national powers. Many
of the restraints on state action in the fields of war and foreign
affairs found in the Constitution, such as those on authorizing privateering or entering into foreign alliances, had close textual ties to
the corresponding provisions of the Articles. 3 4 Similarly, safeguards
for national deliberations from outside interference found their inspiration in the Articles. 3 5 The restraints on national power in the
(power -[t]o define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and
Offenses against tie Law of Nations") with ARTicLEs art. IX, 9 JOURNALS at 916 ("appointing courts for the trial of piracies and felonies committed on the high seas")); and
several aspects of military affairs (comPalre U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 11, 13, 14, 16
(powers to declare war, maintain navy and regulate armed forces) with ARTICLES art.
IX, 9 JOURNALS at 915-20 (granting Congress same powers)).
Although this list of textual similarities could be appreciably extended by considering
other sections of the Constitution, the powers conferred in the Articles were often not
as extensive as those conferred in the corresponding clauses of the Constitution. Moreover, numerous provisions of the Constitution-including the very significant ones creating
the Presidency and granting a national taxing power-had no counterparts in the Articles.
128. U.S. CoxsT. art. I,§ 8, cl.14.
129. 2 M. FARRAND, THE REcORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 330 (1911);
see ARTICLES art. IX, 9 JOURNALS at 919.
130. ARTICLES art. IX, 9 JOURNALS at 920.
131. U.S. CONsT. art. I,§ 8, cl.
2.
132. ARTICLrS art. VIII, 9 JOURNALS at 913; see THE FEDERALIST No. 41 (J.Madison)
278 (J.Cooke ed. 1961). During the Articles Period Congress recommended to the states
an amendment to the Articles relating to the apportionment of charges incurred for
the general welfare. The proposed language was closely followed in the corresponding
provision of the Constitution. Compare 24 JOURNALS at 260-61 with U.S. CoNsT. art.
1, § 2, cl.3.
133. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl.1.
134. Compare U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 10, cls. 1, 3 with ARTICLES art. VI, 9 JOURNALS
at,911-12.
135. The Articles provided:
Freedom of speech and debate in Congress shall not be impeached or questioned
in any court or place out of Congress: and the members of Congress shall be
lprotccted in their persons from arrests and imprisonments, during the time of
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two documents are also closely parallel. 136
The clauses dealing with national citizenship are yet another example of heavy borrowing by the framers of the Constitution from
the Articles Period. The full-faith-and-credit clause was taken over
virtually intact, 3 7 as was the operative language of both the privileges-and-immunities clause and the extradition clause .13
The Constitution's protections of individual rights also reflected
political developments under the Articles. The Constitution clearly
showed, for instance, the strong influence of the Northwest Ordinance,
which had provided for freedom of religion, the availability of habeas
corpus and trial by jury, the prohibition of "cruel or unusual punishments," requirements of due process of law before deprivation of
liberty or property, and the security of private contracts against later
legislation. 139
B.

Continuities in Interpretationand Application

The Articles Period also bequeathed to the framers of the Consituation the practice of expansive interpretation of governing legal
their going to and from, and attendance on Congress, except for treason, felony, or
breach of the peace.
ARTIcLES art. V, 9 JOURNALS at 910.
The Constitution states:
[The Senators and Representatives shall] in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and
Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the
Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same;
and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any
other Place.
U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 6, cl.1.
136. Compare U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 6, cl.2 wzth ARTICLES art. V, 9 JOURNALS at
910 (plural office-holding); compare U.S. CO.ST. art. I, § 9, cl.7 with ARTICLES art.
IX, 9 JOURNALS at 920 (accounting for public funds); compare U.S. CONST. art. I § 9,
cl.8 with ARTICLES art. VI, 9 JOURNALS at 911 (prohibition on conferring titles of nobility).
137. Compare U.S. CoNsr. art. IV, § I ("Full Faith and Credit shall be given in
each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.")
with ARTICLES art. IV, 9 JOURNALS at 909 ("Full faith and credit shall be given in each
of these states to the records, acts, and judicial proceedings of the courts and magistrates
of every other State.")
138. Compare U.S. CoNsT. art. IW, § 2, cl.I ("The Citizens of each State shall be
entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.") with ARTICLES
art. IV, 9 JOURNALS at 908 ("[TJhe free inhabitants of each of these states . . . shall be
entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several States .... ');
compare U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 2, cl.2 (any pelron charged with crime, "who shall
flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on demand of the executive
Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State
having Jurisdiction of the Crime") with ARTICLes art. IV, 9 JOURNALS 'at 909 (if anyone
charged with crime shall "flee from justice and be found in any of the United States, he
shall, upon demand of the governor or executive power of the State from which he
fled, be delivered up and removed to the State having jurisdiction of his offence").
139. See Northwest Ordinance, supra note 91, at 172-74. The Ordinance also banned
"slavery [or] involuntary servitude . . . otherwise than in punishlment of crimeas whereof
the party shall have been duly convicted." Id.

Articles of Confederation
instruments. With or without formal legal authority, the national
government had repeatedly taken a broad view of its own powers,
and the states and the people had acquiesced. The Continental Congresses assumed many economic powers, 140 exercising numerous functions of sovereignty well before the Declaration of Independence, 141
and contemporaries generally had very little patience with the concept that the Articles were intended to be rigid limitations on the
developing powers of the national government. 42
The broad assertions of collective sovereignty advanced in external
affairs, and the generous reading of congressional power used to justify the imposition of a national trade embargo and the creation of
a detailed administrative machinery for the western territories, reflect
this attitude.1 43 The expansive interpretation of the Articles put forward in support of congressional incorporation of the Bank of North
America 44 is another example. In defending the institution against
a threatened revocation of its charter in Pennsylvania, 145 James Wilson
argued that, despite the Articles' reservation to the states of all nondelegated powers, 140 the plan of union required that "[w]henever an
object occurs, to the direction of which no particular state is competent, the management of it must, of necessity, belong to the United
States."' 47 Even if Wilson's views were not shared by all those who
voted for the national bank legislation, his arguments do siuggest the
140.

See Jensen, TESTAMENTS, supra note 2, at 61-62.

141. See Penhallow v. Doane's Adm'rs, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 54, 80-82, 109-13 (1795) (summarizing activities of Congress during war); R. NICHOLS, THE INVENTION OF THE AMERICAN
POLITICAL PARTIES 120-24 (1967) (opening of American ports to foreign trade, authorizing
death by court martial for spies and traitors, adopting rules for navy and capture of
prizes, creating committee to seek foreign aid); Jensen, TESTAMENTS, supra. note 2, at
61-62 (creation of army and appointment of generals, issuance of paper money).
142. See THE FEDERALIST No. 44 (J. Madison) 303 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) ("It would be easy
to shew if it were necessary, that no important power, delegated by the articles of
confederation, has been or can be executed by Congress, without recurring more or less
to the doctrine of construction or implication."); J. WILSON, supra note 84, at 829-30.
One reason for this attitude was doubtless the realization that the Articles themselves
represented essentially a codification of existing congressional practices. See J. FIsKE,
supra note 8, at 101; DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 403.
143. See pp. 152-55 supra.
144. For the proceedings of Congress on the incorporation of the Bank, see 20
JOURNALs at 545-48. For Robert Morris's observations on the plan, see 4 CORRESPONDENCE,
supra note 66, at 566-68. This was not the first congressional foray into the banking
field; in 1780, Congress had pledged the faith of the United States to protect from
loss subscribers to the Bank of Pennsylvania. See B. HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN
AMERICA 43 (1957).
145. See R. BRUNHOUSE, THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION IN PENNSYLVANIA
HA,% MOND, supra note 144, at 52-63.

173-75 (1942); B.

146. See ARTICLES art. II, 9 JOURNALS at 908 ("Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this
confederation expressly delegated to the United States.
147. J. WILSON, supra note 84, at 829.

The Yale Law Journal

Vol. 88: 142, 1978

flexible way in which the Articles often were interpreted to allow
the establishment of pragmatic national institutions.148
The result of this process was that the overall structure of the government chartered by the Constitution was similar in many respects
to the one that already existed under the Articles. A national legislature already engaged actively in the creation of national laws, treaties and policies; a national court of appeals, the institutional predecessor of the Supreme Court,149 rendered judgments superior within
its jurisdiction to state court decisions; and federal administrative
departments carried the national will into execution.150 Both the old
and the new national governments could deal directly with individuals
in certain instances,1 51 and both systems bound individuals into a
common political community by full-faith-and-credit and privilegesand-immunities clauses.' 52 As the Constitution government began its
148. In the case of the western lands, the framers of the Constitution found it necessary to write in a provision granting to Congress the power it had already been exercising: "The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and
Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States
....
" U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. The convention defeated a motion to grant similar
explicit sanction to the power that Congress had exercised in the case of the Bank of
North America, voting down a proposal that the United States be allowed "to grant
charters of incorporation where the interest of the U.S. might require & the legislative
provisions of individual States may be incompetent." See 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 129,
at 615-16. As a result, the debate over the legitimacy of implying such a power continued into the next century. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316
(1819); 3 M. FARSRAND, supra note 129, at 362-64, 375-76.
149. See Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 12, 1 Stat. 275 (1792); Jameson, The Predecesor
of the Supreme Court, in ESSAYS IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES,
supra note 110, at 44. On more than one occasion, Chief Justice Marshall brusquely rejected the argument that the Supreme Court could not carry into effect decrees of the
prize court. See, e.g., Jennings v. Carson, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 2, 4-8, 21, 25 (1807).
150. See Guggenheimer, supra note 110, at 183-84. But see L. WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS:
A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY 1 (1948) (Washington administration inherited almost
no functioning administrative apparatus from Confederation).
151. As James Madison put it:
In cases of capture, of piracy, of the post-office, of coins, weights and measures,
of trade with the Indians, of claims under grants of land by different States, and
above all, in the case of trials by Courts-martial in the army and navy, by which
death may be inflicted without the intervention of a jury, or even of a civil
Magistrate; in all these cases the powers of the confederation operate immediately
on the persons and interests of individual citizens.
THE FEDERALIST No. 40 (J. Madison) 262 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). But cf. National League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 844 (1976) (citing Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.)
71 (1869)) (Constitution substituted government acting directly on individuals for one that
did not do so).
152. It is, however, true that the Constitution government, like the Articles government, was in some respects far removed from the daily life of the citizen. See J. YOUNG, THE
WASHINGTON COMMUNITY 1800-1828, at 28-34 (1966). See also McColley, Jefferson's Rivals:
The Shifting Character of the Federalists, MIDCONTINENT AM. STUD. J., Spring, 1968, at
24 ("Under the supposedly more perfect government of the Constitution of 1787 we

Articles of Confederation
work, the Department of War remained intact under the same individual, 13 and the Post Office employees continued to follow the same
routines as before the transition. 134
Conclusion
The events and experiences of the period from 1777 to 1787 yielded
broad support for a national government operating under a "federal
Constitution adequate to the exigencies of Government and the preservation of the Union." 1 5' Both the Articles and the Constitution
represented a series of pragmatic compromises that codified and expanded on existing practices and impliedly sanctioned flexible interpretation in their implementation. The common law attorneys who
drafted and later construed both charters eschewed strict literalism
and political inflexibility, as they sought a solution to the overriding
problem of creating a national union.
Appendix
The significant textual changes made in the Articles during the
drafting process are summarized in the following table. One or two
alterations that appeared to be merely verbal were not included. Although in several cases the precise strengthening or weakening effect
of a change is questionable, the significance of the table lies not in
the individual items, but rather in the fact that no clear pattern of
changes in either direction is discernible.
had whiskey rebellions, western conspiracies, financial confusion and secessionist plots
quite as alarming as the troubles of the 1780's.")
Indeed, it had been argued in favor of the adoption of the Constitution that it in
fact conferred few new powers on the federal government. See THE FEDERALIST No. 38 (J.
Madison) 247 (J. Cooke ed. 1961); Nelson, supra note 54, at 19 n.70. As Madison put it:
The present Congress can make requisitions to any amount they please; and the
States are constitutionally bound to furnish them; they can emit bills of credit as
long as they will pay for the paper; they can borrow both abroad and at home, as
long as a shilling will be lent. Is an indefinite power to raise troops dangerous?
The Confederation gives to Congress that power also: and they have already begun
to make use of it. . . The existing Congress, without any . . . controul, can make
treaties which they themselves have declared, and most of the States have recognized, to be the supreme law of the land.
THE FEDERALISr, supra, at 247.
153. See M. JENSEN, NATION, supra note 4, at 365; H. WVARD,supra note 64, at 101-03.
154. See Guggenheimer, supra note 110, at 182-83.
155. 32 JOURNALs at 74 (call for Convention); see E. FERGUSON, THE POWER OF THE
PURSE 337 (1961) ("That the crisis of the Union inspired the calling of the Federal Convention indicates such a level of agreement as to suggest that there was no crisis at

all....')
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OF CHANGES IN ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION

ARTICLE

CHANGED

NUMBER
IN FINAL

BETwEEN
DRAFT

EFFECT ON

NUMBERS

GOVERNMENT

I )RAFr

SUBJECT

2

Reserved powers
Reserved powers

1-2
2-3

3
4

Nature of union
Interstate comity
Interstate comity

1-2
1-2
2-3

5

Delegate's appointment
Congressional immunity
Number of delegates
Officeholding restriction
Marque and reprisal
Taxation
Maritime jurisdiction
Congressional judicial power
Treaties of commerce
Appointment of judges
Private land disputes
Regulation of money
Indian affairs
Indian affairs
Western lands
Post office
Commissioning of officers
Adjournment of Congress
Military powers of Congress
Council President's tenure
Expenditures
Expenditures
Accounting for expenditures
Naval forces
Expenses of land forces
Taxation
Peace treaties
Peace treaties

1-2
2-3
2-3
2-3
2-3
2-3
1-2
2-3
2-3
2-3
2-3
2-3
1-2
2-3
1-2
1-2
2-3
1-2
1-2
2-3
1-2
2-3
2-3
1-2
2-3
1-2
1-2
2-3

Appropriation
Commander-in-chief appointment
Council of State
Military powers of Council
Powers of Council
Admission of Canada
Honoring of old debts
Submission to national power

1-2
1-2
2-3
1-2
2-3
2-3
2-3
1-2

6
8
9

10
11
12
13

CENTRAL

Strengthens
Weakens
[1-3 weakens]
Weakens
Weakens
Strengthens greatly
[1-3 strengthens]
Strengthens
Strengthens
Strengthens
Weakens
Weakens slightly
No effect
Weakens
Weakens
Weakens
Weakens
Strengthens
Weakens
Weakens
Weakens
Weakens
Strengthens
Strengthens
Strengthens
Strengthens
Weakens
Strengthens
Strengthens
Weakens
Strengthens
Strengthens
Strengthens
Strengthens
Weakens
[1-3 no effect]
Weakens
Weakens
Strengthens
Weakens
Strengthens
Strengthens
Strengthens
Strengthens

Totai
Chan ges between Drafts I and 2: 18
Changes
Changes
Changes
Changes

166

between
between
between
between

Drafts
Drafts
Drafts
Drafts

I
2
2
2

and
and
and
and

2 strengthening/weakening the central government: 10/18
3: 23
3 strengthening/weakening the central government: 11/11
3 not affecting the central government: I

